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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 In this appeal, we must determine whether certain 
restrictive covenants, which high-performing employees enter 
into as a condition of a stock award, constitute an 
impermissible restraint on trade under New Jersey law.  We 
conclude that these restrictive covenants are not unenforceable 
in their entirety because they serve a legitimate business 
interest, but they may place an undue hardship on employees 
because they are overbroad.  Accordingly, we will remand for 
the District Court to consider whether and to what extent it is 
necessary to curtail the restrictive covenants’ scope, which is 
the approach prescribed by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
when confronted with overbroad restrictive covenants such as 
these.  
 
II. Factual Background 
 
ADP, LLC (ADP) is a human capital management 
company that sells technology products and services related to 
payroll, human resources, benefits, talent management and 
recruiting to customers worldwide.  ADP imposes restrictive 
covenants on its sales employees1 in two layers.  The first layer, 
which applies to all employees and includes a Sales 
Representative Agreement (SRA) and a Non-Disclosure 
Agreement (NDA) entered into at the time of hire, is a 
                                              
 1 Throughout its briefs, ADP refers to these sales 
employees interchangeably as sales “associates” and 
“employees.”  Hereinafter, for simplicity’s sake, we will refer 
to them as “employees.”  
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condition of employment at ADP.  The SRA and NDA prohibit 
ADP employees from, among other things, soliciting any ADP 
“clients, bona fide prospective clients or marketing partners of 
businesses of [ADP] with which the Employee was involved 
or exposed” for one year after termination.  Rafferty JA 42.  
 
The second layer functions differently.  High-
performing ADP employees who meet their sales targets are 
eligible to participate in a stock-option award program, but 
only if they agree to an additional restrictive covenant known 
as the Restrictive Covenant Agreement (RCA).  Participation 
by eligible employees in the stock option program, in other 
words, is voluntary but conditioned on their assent to the terms 
of the RCA.  ADP does not attempt to impose the RCA on other 
employees or in circumstances outside of the stock award 
program.  It is not imposed, for instance, as a condition of 
initial or continued employment or in connection with other 
employment milestones such as a promotion or transfer.  Nor 
does it entitle ADP employees to any employment benefits 
beyond the compensation of the stock option award itself, such 
as more or different training or access to proprietary 
information.   
 
The RCA is undisputedly more onerous than the SRA 
and NDA, and makes it more difficult for former employees 
bound by its restrictions to compete with ADP upon their 
separation from the company.  Specifically, the RCA contains 
a strengthened non-solicitation provision (Non-Solicitation 
Provision), which prohibits employees—for a period of one 
year following their termination (voluntary or involuntary)—
from soliciting any ADP clients to whom ADP “provides,” 
“has provided” or “reasonably expects” to provide business 
within the two-year period following the employee’s 
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termination from ADP.  Rafferty JA 78.  Thus, unlike the SRA, 
which only prohibits solicitation of those ADP clients with 
whom the former employees “w[ere] involved or exposed,” 
Rafferty JA 42, the RCA also prohibits solicitation of all 
current and prospective ADP clients.  And while the SRA 
limits former employees’ solicitation of ADP’s “marketing 
partners,” Rafferty JA 42, the RCA prevents former employees 
from soliciting ADP’s “Business Partners,” which is defined to 
include “referral partners” in addition to “marketing partners,” 
Rafferty JA 76, 78.2 
  
The RCA also contains a non-compete provision that is 
absent from the SRA and NDA (Non-Compete Provision):  For 
a period of one year following their termination, employees 
will not “participate in any manner with a Competing Business 
anywhere in the Territory where doing so will require [them] 
to [either] provide the same or substantially similar services to 
a Competing Business as those which [they] provided to ADP 
while employed,” or “use or disclose ADP’s Confidential 
Information or trade secrets.”  Rafferty JA 78.  The term 
“Territory” is defined as the “geographic area” where the 
employee worked or had contact with ADP clients in the two 
years prior to her termination.  Rafferty JA 77.  
 
                                              
 
2 The SRA’s non-solicitation provision states that 
former employees shall not “solicit, contact, call upon, 
communicate with or attempt to communicate with any Person 
which was a client, bona fide prospective client, or marketing 
partner” of ADP, whereas the RCA’s Non-Solicitation 
Provision states that former employees shall not “engage, 
contract with, solicit, divert, appropriate or accept any business 
from any Business Partner” of ADP.  Rafferty JA 42, 78.  
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 Appellees Nicole Rafferty and Kristi Mork are both 
former employees of ADP who, shortly after voluntarily 
leaving ADP, began working at Ultimate Software Group 
(Ultimate), a direct competitor of ADP.  Rafferty and Mork 
each signed the SRA and NDA at the outset of their 
employment in Boston and Chicago, respectively, and each 
were eligible for and accepted restricted stock awards pursuant 
to the RCA over several consecutive years.3 
 
III. Procedural History 
 
After ADP learned that each of Appellees joined 
Ultimate upon leaving, it filed a motion for preliminary 
injunction against each of Rafferty and Mork in the District of 
New Jersey, seeking enforcement of the SRA, NDA, and RCA, 
and alleging breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and 
unfair competition.  Their cases were consolidated only for 
purposes of this appeal. 
 
A. District Court Proceedings in ADP v. Rafferty 
 (No. 18-cv-1922) 
 
In ADP’s action against Rafferty in the District of New 
Jersey, which was assigned to Judge Linares, ADP sought to 
justify the imposition of all three restrictive covenants.  
Relying on the sworn statement of an ADP executive, ADP 
                                              
3 We use the term “RCA” going forward to refer to the 
2015 RCA because, of the various iterations to which Rafferty 
and Mork agreed to be bound over the years, the 2015 version 
contains the most restrictive terms and, as the RCAs “don’t 
supersede one another,” those terms would “still be in effect.”  
Rafferty Dkt. No. 28 at 11.   
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argued that the SRA and NDA, for their part, contain 
reasonable restrictions designed to protect “the client 
relationships and the goodwill that sales associates will 
develop and help develop in the course of their job duties.”  
Rafferty JA 146.  The RCAs, it urged, are similarly 
reasonable—albeit “more extensive”—because those 
employees that qualify for the stock award “demonstrate that 
they maintain the strongest personal relationships with their 
contacts at ADP and ADP’s clients and prospects,” “generally 
are involved with and have the most information about the 
largest number of ADP’s clients and prospects,” and have 
“demonstrated the greatest ability to attend to the specialized 
needs of ADP’s clients quickly and with continuity.”  Rafferty 
JA 147.  Thus, because the loss of high-performing employees 
to a competitor poses a “particularly high risk to ADP with 
respect to interference with customer and prospect [sic] 
relationships,” ADP maintained that the “heightened restrictive 
covenants in the RCA provisions” are justified.  Rafferty JA 
148. 
 
After a hearing, the District Court granted some of the 
relief requested by ADP.4  Acknowledging Solari Industries, 
                                              
4 While Judge Linares cited his prior decision in ADP, 
LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2:15-3710 (JLL) (JAD), 2015 WL 4670805 
(D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2015)—where he came to the opposite 
conclusion as to the enforceability of the RCAs and held that, 
“prospective clients aside, [ADP] ha[d] articulated all of its 
corporate interests in enforcing the remaining non-competition 
aspects of the [RCA],” id. at *5—he did not distinguish Jacobs 
from the instant case nor explain the reason for this divergent 
outcome.   
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Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J. 1970), where the New Jersey 
Supreme Court articulated factors to determine whether a post-
employment restrictive covenant is enforceable—including 
whether it “[1] simply protects the legitimate interests of the 
employer, [2] imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and 
[3] is not injurious to the public,” id. at 56—the District Court 
concluded that the RCAs were unenforceable per se.  Citing 
Laidlaw, Inc. v. Student Transp. of Am., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
727, 762-63 (D.N.J. 1998), it reasoned that because ADP “does 
not require its employees to enter into the RCAs and does not 
even offer the RCAs to all of its employees,” the “purpose 
behind the RCAs is not to protect [ADP]’s legitimate interests 
but rather to decrease competition.”  ADP, LLC v. Rafferty, No. 
18-1922 (JLL), 2018 WL 1617705, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018).  
The Court also suggested that the RCAs “may also impose an 
undue hardship” on Rafferty because, notwithstanding its 
geographic and temporal scope, the “RCAs apply broadly to 
all of [ADP]’s current or prospective clients regardless of 
whether [Rafferty] had contact with those clients. . . .”  Id. at 
*4 (emphasis in original).  
 
As to the enforceability of the SRA and NDA, however, 
the District Court reasoned that ADP had shown a likelihood 
of success because, under Solari, they serve a legitimate 
business interest in that they “are intended to protect [ADP]’s 
confidential and proprietary information and client 
relationships,” and are “narrowly tailored” to that end.5  Id.  
                                              
5 The District Court further concluded that the SRA and 
NDA satisfied the other elements of the preliminary injunction 
test:  Denial of relief would cause ADP irreparable harm in the 
form of “loss of good will,” Rafferty, 2018 WL 1617705, at *5; 
the balance of the interests tipped towards ADP because 
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Because Rafferty had conceded at a hearing that the SRA and 
NDA were enforceable against her, the District Court did not 
further elaborate as to how those agreements satisfied the 
Solari factors.   
 
B. District Court Proceedings in ADP v. Mork (No. 
 17-cv-4613) 
 
 In ADP’s action against Mork, assigned to Judge 
Cecchi, ADP defended the enforceability of the RCAs on the 
same grounds.  Specifically, it put forth a declaration to support 
its position that those who receive restricted stock “have 
extensive contact with ADP clients because they sell the most 
ADP products and service[s] and are the most successful sales 
associates,” Mork JA 103, and “maintain the closest personal 
relationships with the key contacts and personnel” of ADP’s 
clients and prospects, id., and thus “possess the greatest 
potential to disrupt ADP’s relationships with its clients and 
prospective clients, [and] to harm the goodwill ADP has 
generated in the market,” id.  
 
The District Court rejected those arguments, adopting 
Judge Linares’ reasoning in Rafferty in full, and concluding 
that “due to the RCA’s problematic nature and questions 
concerning their ultimate legitimacy as undue restraints on 
trade, [ADP] has not shown a substantial likelihood of success 
on the merits as to its claims under the RCAs.”  ADP, LLC v. 
Mork, No. 17-4613 (CCC-MF), 2018 WL 3085215, at *4 
(D.N.J. June 22, 2018).   
 
                                              
Rafferty would not be required to quit her job; and the issuance 
of the injunction was in the public interest. 
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IV. Discussion 
 
We review the District Court’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion and any underlying legal 
questions de novo.6  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & 
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994).  
The four-factor preliminary injunction standard requires the 
moving party first to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of 
success and that it would likely suffer irreparable harm absent 
an injunction.  Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 
(3d Cir. 2017), as amended (June 26, 2017).  If the moving 
party makes this threshold showing, the court balances these 
factors, along with the relative hardship that the grant or denial 
of an injunction would inflict on the parties and the public 
interest.  Id. at 179; Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285-86 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
 
Applying New Jersey law, we conclude that both tiers 
of ADP’s restrictive covenants further legitimate business 
interests and otherwise comply with the state’s public policy.  
Where, as here, a district court’s assessment of the merits rests 
on “an erroneous view of the applicable law,” its denial of a 
preliminary injunction cannot stand.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 
F.3d at 1427 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, we will vacate 
the District Court’s order and remand for the District Court to 
blue pencil the agreements and reconsider the four-factor 
preliminary injunction standard. 
 
                                              
6 The District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have interlocutory jurisdiction 
over the District Court’s denial of ADP’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). 
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A.  New Jersey Law 
 
New Jersey has evolved from invalidating overbroad 
restrictive covenants outright to presumptively “compress[ing] 
or reduc[ing]” their scope “so as to render the covenants 
reasonable.”  Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1168 n.4 
(N.J. 1978); see Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 
846 A.2d 604, 608-09 (N.J. 2004).  Known as partial 
enforcement or blue penciling,7 this rule favors granting “that 
limited measure of relief within the terms of the 
noncompetitive agreement” that (1) protects a legitimate 
business interest, (2) does not unduly burden an employee, and 
(3) adheres to the public interest.  Solari, 264 A.2d at 61.  As 
detailed below, by eschewing a dichotomous choice between 
enforcement and invalidation, New Jersey aims to fulfill a 
restrictive covenant’s lawful objectives while nevertheless 
ensuring that such agreements do not unreasonably hinder 
competition or employee mobility.  See Maw, 846 A.2d at 609. 
 
For more than a century, New Jersey has upheld 
restrictive covenants in employment agreements, see Sternberg 
v. O’Brien, 22 A. 348, 349-50 (N.J. Ch. 1891); Mandeville v. 
Harman, 7 A. 37, 41 (N.J. Ch. 1886), but the state initially 
applied an inflexible rule rendering overbroad covenants 
completely unenforceable, Althen v. Vreeland, 36 A. 479, 481 
(N.J. Ch. 1897) (reasoning that a restrictive covenant “if 
                                              
7 As the name suggests, the term “blue penciling” at first 
referred to rendering a restrictive covenant reasonable by 
striking divisible portions, see Solari, 264 A.2d at 57, but in 
New Jersey it has come to mean any tailoring of a restrictive 
covenant, Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 892 
n.3 (N.J. 2005). 
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enforced at all, it must be enforced according to its terms”).  
The doctrine evinced a judicial reluctance to modify 
agreements; under this view, “distill[ing] from the broad 
generalities” in a restrictive covenant “narrower and more 
meaningful restrictions would constitute no less than a 
rewriting of the provision.”  Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. 
v. Aiken, 198 A.2d 136, 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964); 
see Mandeville, 7 A. at 38.  Secondary doctrines lessened the 
harshness of the complete-invalidation rule by allowing for the 
enforcement of “divisible” clauses or subsets, see Creter v. 
Creter, 145 A.2d 149, 153-54 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1958), 
but these exceptions “exalted formalisms and rewarded artful 
draftsmanships,” Solari, 264 A.2d at 60. 
 
In its seminal decision in Solari Industries, Inc. v. 
Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J. 1970), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court jettisoned the complete-invalidation rule, permitting the 
partial enforcement of restrictive covenants where consistent 
with public policy.  See 264 A.2d at 61.  Under its prior 
approach, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, courts 
struck down restrictive covenants even when “justice and 
equity seemed to cry out for the issuance of appropriately 
limited restraints.”  Id. at 60.  That is, employers may “act in 
full good faith” only to “find that the terms of the 
noncompetitive agreement are later judicially viewed as 
unnecessarily broad.”  Id. at 56.  Under these circumstances, 
Solari recognized that tailoring overbroad restrictive covenants 
better accorded with the parties’ written agreement than 
wholesale invalidation.  See id.  In other instances, the 
complete-invalidation rule encouraged courts to fully enforce 
“sweeping noncompetitive agreements” where, if given a 
choice, “they would have cut them down to satisfy the 
particular needs at hand.”  Id. at 60.  Under the new approach, 
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while an employer that “extracts a deliberately unreasonable 
and oppressive noncompetitive covenant” should receive no 
benefit, courts should partially enforce an overbroad covenant 
as long as it is “[1] reasonably necessary to protect [an 
employer’s] legitimate interests, [2] will cause no undue 
hardship on the defendant, and [3] will not impair the public 
interest.”  Id. at 56, 61. 
 
Following Solari, New Jersey courts have strived, if 
possible, to salvage restrictive covenants, construing the 
opinion’s three-part test as rarely justifying the total 
invalidation of a restrictive covenant.  See, e.g., Coskey’s 
Television & Radio Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Foti, 602 A.2d 789, 
793, 796 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (blue penciling a 
restrictive covenant that had “devastating effects” on the 
employee and “only limited” effects on the employer to permit 
“substantially narrower enforcement”).  As to what business 
interests qualify as “legitimate,” Solari, 264 A.2d at 61, an 
“employer has no legitimate interest in preventing competition 
as such” or simply prohibiting an employee from exercising 
her “general knowledge” within the industry, Whitmyer Bros., 
Inc. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. 1971); see Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892-93 (N.J. 1988).  But 
New Jersey courts have stressed that employers have “patently 
legitimate” interests in their trade secrets, confidential business 
information, and customer relationships.8  Whitmyer Bros., 274 
                                              
8 New Jersey has accepted that an employer may adopt 
a restrictive covenant to protect some “highly specialized, 
current information not generally known in the industry” even 
if it does not qualify as a trade secret or confidential business 
information.  Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 894; see Cmty. 
Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 897.  This interest must be 
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A.2d at 581; Cmty. Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 897.  As long as 
the restrictive covenant reasonably protects one of these 
matters, the employer has adduced a “strong” business interest.  
Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 892. 
 
Most relevant here, in A. T. Hudson & Co., Inc. v. 
Donovan, 524 A.2d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), the 
Appellate Division enforced a management consulting firm’s 
restrictive covenant to protect its former employee’s client 
relationships.  Id. at 416.  The restrictive covenant, the court 
recognized, safeguarded the “significant investment of time, 
effort and money” the consulting firm expended “soliciting 
clients and developing projects for their benefit.”  Id.  A 
restrictive covenant protects this substantial investment in a 
discrete set of clients, especially for employees who 
maintained close, continual contact with the employer’s 
business partners.  See id. at 413-14, 416; Coskey’s, 602 A.2d 
at 795. 
 
If a restrictive covenant reaches beyond an employer’s 
legitimate interests, courts applying New Jersey law have 
typically resorted to blue penciling to fulfill the contract’s 
lawful ends.  See Coskey’s, 602 A.2d at 796.  For instance, 
where a restrictive covenant covers products for which no trade 
secrets existed, courts have blue penciled the agreement to 
extricate them.  See, e.g., Raven v. A. Klein & Co. Inc., 478 
A.2d 1208, 1211-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); see also 
Saccomanno v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 1329038, at *5 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2010) (limiting an agreement 
covering all “information” to just “trade secrets or confidential 
                                              
“construe[d] narrowly,” Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 894, and 
does not pertain to the present dispute. 
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information”).  Or, if a restrictive covenant seeks to protect 
client relationships, courts have narrowed the covenant to 
clients with which the employee interfaced.  See, e.g., Saturn 
Wireless Consulting, LLC v. Aversa, No. 17-1637 (KM/JBC), 
2017 WL 1538157, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2017). 
 
The other two Solari factors—undue hardship and the 
public interest—likewise rarely favor the complete 
nullification of a restrictive covenant.  The second Solari 
factor’s focus on undue hardship lends itself to blue penciling, 
not complete invalidation.  Seldom could an employee credibly 
contend that, even where an employer has proffered a 
legitimate business purpose, any enforcement of a restrictive 
covenant would pose an undue burden.  See Ingersoll-Rand, 
542 A.2d at 892 (a court must balance the employer’s interest 
against the hardship inflicted).  And under the “public interest” 
factor, New Jersey has recognized only two professions for 
which a client’s freedom to choose or the “uniquely personal” 
nature of the relationship militate against enforcing any 
restrictive covenant.  Comprehensive Psychology Sys., P.C. v. 
Prince, 867 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(psychologists); see Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 
607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992) (attorneys); Cmty. Hosp. Grp., 
869 A.2d at 895 (noting that “[e]xcept for attorneys and . . . 
psychologists, our courts have consistently utilized a 
reasonableness test to determine the enforceability of 
restrictive covenants” (internal citations omitted)). 
 
Simply put, New Jersey accepts that “non-compete 
agreements are a common part of commercial employment,” 
and its Solari framework “recognizes that noncompete 
agreements can serve a useful purpose so long as the agreement 
is not unreasonable.”  Maw, 846 A.2d at 609.  To ensure that 
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such agreements remain reasonable, New Jersey courts do not 
hesitate to blue pencil a covenant but will rarely invalidate one 
in full.  See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 899-900. 
 
B. Application to the RCA 
 
Mindful of New Jersey’s strong preference for blue 
penciling, we turn to whether ADP’s second tier of restrictive 
covenants, the RCA, is wholly invalid.  In evaluating the RCA, 
we consider (1) whether ADP has a legitimate business interest 
in imposing the RCA in exchange for participation in its stock-
award program; (2) if so, whether that legitimate business 
interest is negated because the RCA, which is imposed on a 
subset of ADP employees, is layered on top of the SRA and 
NDA, which are imposed on all employees; (3) whether the 
breadth of the RCA imposes a level of hardship on employees 
so great as to render it entirely unenforceable; and (4) whether, 
on balance, the RCA is injurious to the public. 
 
1. The RCA Serves a Legitimate Business 
 Interest 
 
The enforceability of the RCA, a supplemental layer of 
restrictive covenants that are imposed on only those ADP 
employees who qualify for and accept ADP’s stock-option 
award, depends on whether it “simply protects the legitimate 
interests of [ADP].”  Solari, 264 A.2d at 56.  Appellees 
concede that ADP has a legitimate interest in protecting its 
client relationships by imposing the more modest restrictions 
set forth in the SRA and NDA on all employees, but argue that 
it has no legitimate interest in imposing the “more onerous 
RCAs” on a small group of high-performing employees 
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because “ADP’s legitimate interests were fully protected by 
the SRA and NDA.”  Rafferty’s Br. 19.  We disagree.   
 
The preservation of client relationships and the 
goodwill they generate are among the business interests that 
New Jersey courts consistently recognize as legitimate and 
worthy of protection.  See Whitmyer, 274 A.2d at 581; A. T. 
Hudson & Co., 524 A.2d at 415.  As a client services business, 
ADP’s viability depends on its ability to attract—and retain—
its clients.  And by setting sales goals for its employees and 
identifying the subset of employees that meet or exceed those 
goals, ADP has the ability to empirically measure which of its 
employees have more extensive client contact.  Employees can 
achieve this more extensive client contact in one of two ways—
by virtue of selling to a greater number of customers or by 
selling more products to a smaller number of customers.  Either 
way, post-termination competition from those employees or 
their solicitation of ADP’s clients and Business Partners would 
pose a greater threat to ADP’s business than would that of 
employees who failed to meet their sales goals and thus, 
necessarily, have less contact with ADP’s clients.  ADP 
therefore has a legitimate business interest in imposing the 
RCA on this subset of employees, and the RCA’s heightened 
restrictive covenants, over and above those in the SRA and 
NDA, are reflective of the greater damage those employees 
could inflict on ADP upon their departure. 
 
2. Selective Imposition of the RCA Does Not 
 Negate ADP’s Legitimate Business 
 Interests  
 
Appellees additionally argue, and the District Courts 
agreed, that any legitimate interest in protecting client 
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relationships that the RCA may serve is negated by virtue of 
the fact that it is selectively imposed on a subset of ADP 
employees as a second layer of restrictive covenants, and is not 
conditional of anything other than receipt of the stock award 
itself.  They argue that because the acceptance of the RCA was 
not a condition of initial or continued employment, it did not 
entitle the employees to access any “additional” or “different” 
confidential information, such as client lists, Rafferty Br. 19-
20, and was not tied to any specific employment milestones, 
the imposition of the RCA bespeaks an intent to “prevent[] 
competition as such,” Whitmyer, 274 A.2d at 581, rendering 
any proffered legitimate business interest mere pretext. 
 
Appellees’ argument largely relies on the reasoning set 
forth in Laidlaw, which held that a restrictive covenant tied to 
a stock-option award was an unenforceable restraint of trade 
under New Jersey law because its “primary purpose” was “to 
buy out potential competition.”  20 F. Supp. 2d at 763.  
Framing the issue in colloquial terms, the district court noted 
that businesses typically require prospective employees to sign 
restrictive covenants that say, in effect: 
 
We want to hire you.  But if you come work for 
us, you will obtain confidential information and 
develop customer relationships while working 
here.  After you leave us, we do not want you to 
go out and use that information and those 
relationships to harm us.  So if you want to work 
for us, you have to first promise that you will not 
compete against us for a period after you leave 
us.  
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Id. at 763.  Because the restrictive covenant was not a condition 
of “employment, obtaining a particular position within the 
Company, receiving confidential information, or the 
opportunity to develop customer relationships,” and instead the 
employees bound by it had begun receiving proprietary 
information and developing client relationships before 
agreeing to its terms, the district court concluded that they 
served no legitimate business interest and were per se 
unenforceable.  Id. at 763-65. 
 
We, like most courts that have confronted this issue,9 
are not persuaded by Laidlaw and decline to adopt its 
                                              
9 While the District Judges here and Judge Kessler of 
the New Jersey Superior Court found Laidlaw persuasive in 
this context, see ADP, LLC v. Hobaica, No. C-118-16 (Oral 
Op. N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 23, 2018) (Rafferty 
Addendum 72-75); ADP, LLC v. Kusins, No. ESX-C-264-15 
(Ltr. Op. N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. June 27, 2017) (Rafferty JA 
585-659); ADP, LLC v. DeMarco, No. C-120-16 (Ltr. Op. N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 27, 2017) (Rafferty Addendum 1-69), 
most judges have not, see ADP, LLC v. LeNoble, No. ESX-C-
117-16 (Ltr. Op. N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Jan. 24, 2018) 
(Rafferty JA 897-936); ADP, LLC v. Manchir, No. M2016-
02541, 2017 WL 5185458 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017); 
ADP, LLC v. Hopper, No. ESX-C-23-16, (Oral Op. N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. June 30, 2017) (Rafferty JA 770-830); ADP, LLC 
v. Karamitas, No. ESX-C-143-16 (Oral Op. N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. June 30, 2017) (Rafferty JA 850-895); ADP, LLC v. 
Lynch, Nos. 2:16-1053 (WJM), 2:16-01111 (WJM), 2016 WL 
3574328 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016), aff’d 678 F. App’x 77, 80 (3d 
Cir. 2017); ADP, LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2:15-3710 (JLL) (JAD), 
2015 WL 4670805 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2015). 
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reasoning.10  And while the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that it may be “difficult to draw” the line 
                                              
 
10 Relatedly, Appellees’ argument that ADP should be 
collaterally estopped from arguing that the RCAs are 
enforceable because a number of trial court decisions have held 
the RCAs unenforceable is meritless.  Whether a state court 
judgment should have a preclusive effect in a subsequent 
federal action depends on the law of the state that adjudicated 
the original action; here, the law of New Jersey.  Greenleaf v. 
Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).  “New Jersey 
courts follow the doctrine of collateral estoppel or the rule of 
issue preclusion described in the Restatement of 
Judgments.”  Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 684 A.2d 
1385, 1391 (N.J. 1996).  The Restatement states, in pertinent 
part, that in order to avoid a preclusion bar, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it “lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue” in the prior proceeding, or that “other circumstances 
justify affording [plaintiff] an opportunity to relitigate the 
issue.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982).  
Among the factors to be considered as to this limitation of 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent litigation is whether “[t]he 
determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent 
with another determination of the same issue,” id., in which 
case a court’s “confidence [in the result] is generally 
unwarranted,” id. § 29 cmt. f.  Here, there are clearly 
inconsistent prior determinations, such that this Court cannot 
be confident in (in fact, it rejects) the result Judge Kessler 
reached in cases finding these restrictions unenforceable.  
Accordingly, ADP is not precluded from arguing that the RCA 
is enforceable, notwithstanding any prior judgments to the 
contrary. 
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between a corporation’s legitimate attempts to protect its client 
relationships and illegitimate attempts to lay claim to the 
“general skills and knowledge of a highly sophisticated 
employee,” Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 894, we do not 
perceive a bright line rule that restrictive covenants are 
unenforceable restraints on trade if imposed selectively and as 
a second layer—the rule apparently endorsed by the Laidlaw 
court and the District Courts here—to be consistent with Solari 
and its progeny.   
 
For one, ADP’s two-tiered system of binding only a 
subset of high-performing employees necessarily amounts to 
less of a restraint on trade than a single-tier system in which 
ADP imposed the RCA on all employees at the outset of 
employment.  While New Jersey courts certainly recognize that 
“[e]ach client that [ADP] is able to attract represents a 
significant investment of time, effort and money which is 
worthy of protection,” ADP is not in a position to know at the 
time of hire from which of its employees it will most need that 
protection.  A. T. Hudson & Co., 524 A.2d at 416.  Thus, ADP 
restrains trade less by declining to uniformly, and perhaps 
prophylactically, impose the RCA until it knows, through the 
proxy of met sales targets, which of its employees will go on 
to develop either a greater number of or deeper relationships 
with ADP’s clients (or both).  Appellees object that “ADP did 
not and cannot offer any evidence that high performers bound 
to the more restrictive RCAs have access to additional 
confidential information that is not available to lower 
performers who are only bound by the SRA and NDA.”  
Rafferty Br. 20.  But as even Appellees seem to recognize, that 
observation bears only on ADP’s ability “to meet its burden to 
show that the RCAs were aimed at protecting ADP’s 
confidential information,” id. (emphasis added); it does not 
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detract from the ample evidence in the record that the RCA is 
aimed at protecting ADP’s client relationships. 
 
Nor are we persuaded that because “[p]articipation in 
ADP’s incentive stock awards was entirely voluntary,” Mork 
Br. 26, and because ADP does not penalize its qualifying 
employees for declining to accept the award and 
accompanying RCA, “the primary purpose of the stock-option 
non-competes is not to protect [ADP’s] legitimate interests, but 
to buy out potential competition,” Laidlaw, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 
763.  For starters, we find the premise of this argument itself 
questionable, for ADP employees who decline to agree to the 
RCA are penalized in that they must forego the compensation 
award that they otherwise have earned.  But more 
fundamentally, ADP’s decision not to further penalize 
employees for rejecting the RCA is not proof that the RCA is 
“principally directed at lessening competition.”  Ingersoll-
Rand, 542 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted).  Rather, as reflected 
in the declarations of ADP’s witnesses, it manifests a 
reasonable business judgment as to how to best balance its 
employees’ and the public’s need for free competition with its 
own need to protect its legitimate business interests.11 
                                              
11 We are not unmindful of the language appearing in 
one of the declarations submitted by ADP in support of its 
motions for preliminary injunction that identifies as one 
justification for the RCA the notion that employees subject to 
it have demonstrated “unique knowledge, skills and job 
performance,” Rafferty JA 148—precisely the kinds of 
intangible tools that New Jersey courts say employers have “no 
legitimate interest” in protecting, Whitmyer Bros., 274 A.2d at 
581.  That isolated statement, however, does not undermine 
ADP’s other evidence reflecting that the RCA principally 
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In concluding that ADP’s interests are strong enough to 
warrant enforcement of its RCA, we do not disregard the fact 
that Appellees may have countervailing interests, including 
that they have acquired skill and expertise while working at 
ADP that have “become part of the[ir] person,” and that now 
“belong to [them] as [individuals] for the transaction of any 
business in which [they] may engage.”  Id. at 892 (citation 
omitted).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court instructs, 
however, under these circumstances courts should tailor the 
restrictions through the process of blue penciling rather than 
holding them to be void per se where, as here, there is no 
allegation or evidence of bad faith.  See Solari, 264 A.2d at 61.  
We turn next to that analysis. 
 
3. Undue Hardship 
 
Under New Jersey law, “[e]ven if the covenant is found 
enforceable” because it serves legitimate business interests, “it 
may be limited in its application concerning its geographical 
area, its period of enforceability, and its scope of activity” so 
that those interests are not outweighed by the hardship the 
covenant inflicts on the employee.  Coskey’s, 602 A.2d at 793 
(citations omitted).   To determine whether and to what extent 
the RCA must be blue penciled, the Court must “balance the 
                                              
serves a legitimate business purpose.  Even in the declaration 
in which this troubling language appears, the declarant goes on 
to explain that the RCA is imposed on those employees who, 
by virtue of their client relationships developed over time, have 
“the greatest potential to disrupt ADP’s relationships with its 
clients and prospective clients, [and] to harm the goodwill 
ADP has generated in the market.”  Rafferty JA 148. 
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employer’s need for protection and the hardship on the 
employee that may result.”  Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A.2d at 894.   
 
We acknowledge that the enforcement of the RCA 
would impose some level of hardship on former ADP 
employees who want to market themselves in the same field in 
which they have previously worked.  After all, it would require 
them to refrain from soliciting business from anyone “with 
whom ADP reasonably expects business within the two (2) 
year period following [their] . . . termination of employment,” 
and to refrain from working “in any manner with a Competing 
Business anywhere in the Territory where doing so will require 
[them]” to either “provide the same or substantially similar 
services to a Competing Business as those which [they] 
provided to ADP while employed,” or “use or disclose ADP’s 
Confidential Information or trade secrets.”  Rafferty JA 78.  
“The question remains, however, whether this hardship [is] 
‘undue,’ when balanced against the legitimate interest of the 
employer.”  Coskey’s, 602 A.2d at 794.   
 
Many courts considering the enforceability of the RCA, 
including Judge Linares in a decision three years before the 
case presently before us, have concluded, at the very least, that 
“restricting [former ADP employees] from soliciting 
prospective clients—of which [they] did not gain knowledge 
of [sic] through ADP”—is not a reasonable covenant 
provision.  ADP, LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2:15-3710 (JLL) (JAD), 
2015 WL 4670805, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2015); see also ADP, 
LLC v. Lynch, Nos. 2:16-1053 (WJM), 2:16-01111 (WJM), 
2016 WL 3574328, at *7-*9 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016), aff’d 678 
F. App’x 77, 80 (3d Cir. 2017); ADP, LLC v. Manchir, No. 
M2016-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 5185458, at *6-*9 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017).  Others have deemed heavier 
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blue penciling necessary to render the RCA not unduly 
burdensome, by, inter alia, limiting the restricted “Territory” 
in the non-compete in terms of both geographic area and 
market share, see ADP, LLC v. LeNoble, No. ESX-C-117-16 
(Ltr. Op. N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Jan. 24, 2018) (Rafferty JA 
930) (“The Court finds that the non-competition clauses in this 
matter should be limited to both the northwest Chicago suburbs 
and to employers with fewer than fifty employees.”), or by 
“blue pencil[ing] the geographic restriction [contained in the 
non-compete clause] into the non-solicitation clause,” ADP, 
LLC v. Hopper, No. ESX-C-23-16, (Oral Op. N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. June 30, 2017) (Rafferty JA 809). 
 
Here, ADP concedes—perhaps in light of these 
decisions—that the non-solicitation provision of the RCA is 
overbroad and must be blue penciled to the extent that it 
restricts employees from soliciting prospective clients “of 
which [Appellees] did not gain knowledge of [sic] through 
ADP.”  ADP Rafferty Br. 19 (quoting Jacobs, 2015 WL 
4670805, at *5).  The District Courts, however, having 
concluded that the RCA was unenforceable per se, did not have 
occasion to consider the effect of this concession or the extent 
to which the RCA could be blue penciled to avoid an undue 
burden on Appellees.   
 
They also did not have an opportunity to consider other 
facts relevant to the extent of the hardship Appellees will suffer 
if the RCA is enforced, including whether it would preclude 
the employee from being able to earn a living in his or her 
occupation,12 see Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1169, and the fact that 
                                              
12 On this point, ADP contends that contrary to Judge 
Linares’ conclusion that ADP “seeks to enjoin [Rafferty] from 
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both Appellees voluntarily resigned from ADP and chose to 
immediately join Ultimate, a direct competitor, thereby 
arguably “br[inging] any hardship upon [themselves],” Cmty. 
Hosp. Grp., 869 A.2d at 898.  
 
In short, the undue hardship factor, too, counsels in 
favor of blue penciling and, in any event, compels a remand for 
the District Court to determine in the first instance the extent 
of the employees’ hardship and the specific revisions that could 
be made to render the RCA reasonable under the 
circumstances.    
 
4. Injury to the Public 
 
 The final Solari factor instructs courts to consider the 
fact that “enforcement of the restriction should not cause harm 
to the public.”  Id. (citing Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1161).  Because 
this case contains “no major public component,” the imposition 
of restrictive covenants here creates no injury to the public in 
the nature of “the rights of the public to have free access to the 
advice of professionals licensed by the State,” Coskey’s, 602 
A.2d at 793, as it may, for example, in the context of physicians 
                                              
working for Ultimate for a period of twelve months,” Rafferty, 
2018 WL 1617705, at *3, it is merely asking “that she be 
precluded from working within her prior ADP territory for one 
year, consistent with the terms of the RCAs,” ADP Rafferty 
Br. 25.  “Since her territory at [Ultimate] is larger than her 
territory was at ADP, there is no reason for her to be required 
to quit her job.  Id.  While the District Courts found these points 
salient with respect to the Solari analysis of the SRA and NDA, 
they did not reach them with respect to the RCA, having 
concluded that they are unenforceable per se.  
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and accountants, see Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1169-70 (physicians); 
Schuhalter v. Salerno, 653 A.2d 596, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1995) (accountants).  Here, the public interest points both 
ways—towards the employees’ ability to use their marketable 
skills and the employer’s interest in protecting its goodwill and 
client relationships—and is ultimately equivocal.  Thus, we are 
confident that the approach outlined above balances the 
relative interests of ADP and Appellees in a way that comports 
with the public interest, including the clear preference under 
New Jersey law to modify overbroad restrictive covenants 
rather than nullify them outright.  
 
   *   *  * 
 
Having concluded that the RCA is not a per se 
unenforceable restraint on trade and that each of the Solari 
factors favors at least partial enforcement, we will leave the 
next steps concerning appropriate balancing and blue penciling 
in the capable hands of the District Courts. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Courts and will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
